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included an opportunity for audience members to go
behind-the-scenes and see some of the animals before
the show. Not all of the animals were on display. The
monkeys, living in small, enclosed metal boxes, were
not available for public viewing.
Several elephants, however, were visible immediately
upon entering the area. They were chained by a front
and a back ankle and could barely move as a result. In
one hour, I heard eight children ask their parents why
the elephants' legs were chained and eight parents
respond that it was for the child's own safety and that
the animals were not being hurt. When I tried to talk to
the children about their observations, the parents
moved them away only slightly more politely than they
would from a pedophile.
The innocent observations of children have been
adequately sentimentalized elsewhere; suffice it to
observe for present purposes that there is something
that happens to humans between the stages of childhood
and adulthood, something that induced these adults to
abandon their own inclinations, their very observations
and any memory of the articles they had recently read
in the paper about why the by-law was passed in the
frrst place, to a belief that everything was all right.
Perhaps the parents assumed that this way of holding
the animals was temporary, or perhaps they chose not
to wonder how else the elephants might be held and
transported. Their response was of course a result of

At the Labor Day pigeon shoot in Hegins, Pennsylvania,
thousands of emaciated birds are released from trap
boxes to be shot and killed by drunken Americans or
wounded and then suffocated by their sons, all following
a patriotic execution of the national anthem. In the
preface of Animals, Property and the Law, Gary
Francione relays a personal account of the spectacle.
This review of Francione's book also begins with a
personal account.
In 1992, the Canadian city of Toronto, inspired by
evidence of the cruelties to exotic animals inherent in
the circus and of the accompanying risks to human safety,
passed an amendment to an existing by-law and thereby
prohibited the keeping of certain exotic animals in the
city. Included among the prohibited species were those
that are commonly used in circuses, such as elephants,
monkeys, apes, lions and tigers. Ringling Bros. and
Garden Bros. circuses, along with the corporation which
owns the Skydome, Toronto's largest stadium,
challenged the amendment to the by-law in court and
ultimately succeeded in having it struck down. l
In order to combat some of the undesirable press
about the lives of circus animals which arose at the time,
the Garden Bros.' first visit to Toronto post-court case
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rationalism, this is too simple an analysis of a complex
process that may in fact have occurred over many
millennia and has had ramiftcations too important to
be casually underSITOod.
Francione's approach reminds readers to consider
well-known religious and philosophical sources in
context and in combination. He ftnds early traces of
the current ideology in classical antiquity and comments
as well on the importance of John Locke, who connected
the theological assumption that god gave animals to
humanity with the economic perspective befitting his
ideology: god gave the animal species to mankind (the
gender term is intentional), but man cannot make use
of the animal gift unless an individual man can claim a
right to an individual animal.
In fact, Francione notes other writers who have
offered the possibility that our very notion of property
may have developed around the commoditization of
cattle (the word "cattle," for example, comes from the
same etymological root as "capital").
John Livingston, in discussing the consequences of
the process of self-imposed human domestication in his
book Rogue Primate, devotes considerable thought to
evidence of human domination and domestication of
nature having emerged long before Aristotle and even
earlier than the da"m of sedentarism and agriculture. It
would be interesting to hear more from Francione on
this point; his thoughts in this volume are incisive but
brief. Understanding both the source and sustenance of
the current ideology is crucial to those who seek to
dismantle it. As Animals, Property and the Law subtly
proves, it is perception, as a precursor to or ideally as
an alternative to law, which must be the focus of any
further efforts toward change.
The current dualistic paradigm, in which humans
are on one side of the equation and everything that is
nonhuman is on the other, is contradictory to say the least,
and Francione exposes the paradox. While everybody
claims to be opposed to cruelty to animals and while the
law purports to reflect this concern by way oflegislation
that prohibits unnecessary suffering and requires
animals to be treated humanely, it is permissible to
routinely subject them to barbaric behavior.
In present day North America we take property rights
quite seriously.3 Humans own property: land, cars,
furniture, stock in corporations. Animals are property:
models in experiments, machinery in food production,
exhibits in zoos... Resolution of any conflict between
the interests of a property owner and any interest we

many psychological, sociological and economic
components which are slightly, but only slightly, beyond
the scope of this book review. Certainly one of the
factors which facilitated their reaction was a
fundamental belief in our system of laws to prevent
harms from being caused; they were no different than
their fellow members of society who believe that the
justice system is both intended to be and is successful
at preventing evils.
In 1993, ninety million new cases were filed in
America's state courts. 2 Litigation has become a way
of life, and our faith in it verges on religious. It is this
faith in the system, and in the very notion of stateenforced justice, which begins to erode as one proceeds
through Francione's book.
H is not always easy or desirable to say whata book
is about in one sentence, but here it is both: Francione's
intention is to show that in the American legal system
(his comments are equally applicable in Canada) where
animals are property and humans are property owners,
animals do not and cannot have rights. Most jurisdictions in the country have laws which seem at ftrst
glance to protect animals, but when one contemplates
the nature of the legal system and what interests the
law is seeking to protect, it becomes an irrefutable
proposition that animals lose out whenever humans
want to exploit them.
In making his point, Francione is trying to speak
to parents and activists as well as to scholars and
lawyers. He exposes legal principles without relying
on the sort of jargon that makes other books about
law incomprehensible or uninteresting to non-lawyers,
and he offers a compelling analysis of the structure of
the legal system which is universal in its possible
applications. He happens to be writing about animals,
but those who concern themselves with other disempowered groups should be attentive to his critique.
The book is presented in three parts. The second
and third parts offer specific examples to prove the
thesis established in the first. Part I is arguably the
most important, as it comprises an examination of the
general way in which human behavior in respect of
animals is determined in accordance with our rules
about property ownership and includes a discussion
of both the origin and the effect of animals' status as
property. While those who contemplate animal issues
often start from the position that property status was
established in the biblical reference to man's
"dominion" over the animals and ripened in Cartesian
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these cows being fed anyway). As soon as her value in
food production was destroyed, so was the cow.
Using the above and other examples, Francione
reveals two important truths. First, the existing
regulation of animal use never exceeds the degree of
protection which facilitates the most economically
efficient exploitation of the animal. Second, absolutely
no conceivable treatment of an animal is illegal, so long
as it is administered in the approved economic comext
The analysis reveals another distasteful effect of a
structure whose major interest is economic, namely lllat
it accepts certain behavior which is common among its
elite supporters, those with lots of property, but refuses
to accept corresponding behavior on the part of the
disempowered property-less. Francione compares the
illegality of dog fighting, which is more common among
the latter, to horse racing, which is favoured by the
middle and upper classes.
He also tells in some detail the story of the prosecution
of the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye by the City of
Hialeah, Rorida. The members of the church, nmnbering
in the hundreds of thousands or millions of people in
the United States, practice Santeria, a religion which
involves the ritual sacrifice of animals. The members
of the church are also primarily black. The city's attempt
to stop the sacrifices by way of the state anti-cruelty
law, although ultimately unsuccessful, cannot help but
illustrate the distinct absence of prosecution of other
rituals by which animals in the United States are
systematically brutalized. The suffering of animals in
food production, science and entertainment would
appear to be authorized by a more popular bible and
celebrated by a more powerful congregation.
Francione calls the phenomenon summarized
above "legal welfarism," which he specifically
describes as a normative theory implicit in the law,
whose fundamental assumptions are never challenged,
according to which it is morally acceptable, at least in
some circumstances, to kill animals or subject them
to suffering, as long as an effort is made to ensure that
they are treated humanely. The fact that we operate
on the basis of the status quo without ever questioning
underlying assumptions in the law is a theme that
recurs in the book and should be recurring more subtly
and on a broader scale in the reader's mind while
proceeding through it
Francione posits tJmt legal welfarism establishes a
strong presumption in favor of a general theory of
animal welfare, the view that it is morally acceptable,

may allribute to her animal property has been
determined by our characterization of the parties at the
outset Our justice system, whose raison d'etre is the
protection of our interest in property, is uninterested in
the life of the property itself. There are restrictions in
law on our use of animals; however, there are
restrictions on the use of all property (I have all of the
rights associated with ownership over my pen, however,
1 may not generally use it as a weapon), and there is no
concern for the animal herself at the law's core.
While the normative assumption that animals exist
for human ends goes unchallenged, courts and
legislators do recognize a distinction between animate
and inanimate property: notions of "humane" treatment
and "unnecessary" suffering are superimposed on the
scheme of regulations. However, the key to legal
terminology is interpretation, and "unnecessary" and
"inhumane" are interpreted in light of the existing legal
status of animals as property and the lengths to which
we are willing to go (Le., constitutional guarantees) to
preserve the capital "p" in Property.
Examples are abundant: corporal punishment of the
dog is necessary to train her not to mess in the house;
death by electrocution is necessary to protect the fox's
coat; chaining the ankles is necessary to control the
circus elephant. Francione finds an example in the food
industry. While it has for many years been lawful to
brand and castrate food animals without anesthetic, to
say nothing of myriad other daily abuses suffered as
they are fattened and delivered for slaughter, these being
practices "necessary" to the efficient process of food
production, those who have let their cattle starve to
death, thus allowing resources to be wasted, have been
convicted of cruelly.
An event which attracted much media attention since
the publication ofAnimals, Property and the Law further
illustrates the point Consider the excitement around
the outbreak ofBSE, better known as Mad Cow Disease,
in Britain in the spring of 1996. Front page media
reported all of the concerns regarding human safety
(what was the cause of the disease, where had it spread,
what people might be exposed to it) and economic loss
(the effect on Britain's economy of a European ban on
beef and any products tlmt might contain any amount
of beef by-products, where will the animals be
slaughtered, who will reimburse the farmers) with a
distinct absence of any discussion of the cows
themselves (whether or how the animals could be
treated, where they might live out their lives, what are
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at least in some circumstances, to kill animals or subject
them to suffering as long as the treatment is as humane
as possible. Legal welfarism also generates a strong
presumption in favor of letting the owner determine
what uses best maximize the value of the property and
what treatment is ''necessary'' for her particular purpose;
the animal user thus becomes the real judge of whether
her own behavior is lawful or not.
This analysis coincides with a concern regarding
specialization that has been leveled by thinkers in
various disciplines, namely that we have discarded our
independent existence in exchange for reliance upon a
collection of experts. We accept (in a technological age
this is unavoidable to a certain degree) largely
unchallenged their advice on problems in their selected
field. We are no longer expected to think for ourselves.
Nor, as domesticated animals, do we have any interest
in doing so anyway.
One distinction that is not clear in the book is
between those whose ideology is what Francione has
called "legal welfarism," and those who choose what
might be identified as welfarist methods despite a
belief that animals ought not to be seen merely as
means to human ends. The former group includes
animal users who are likely to feign an interest in
animals' well-being in response to growing pressure,
while the latter might well be comprised of people
whose motivation is sincere and who are willing to
consider what are perceived to be welfarist steps with
the intent, perhaps misconceived, of achieving
improvements for animals incrementally.
This latter position can neither be summarily
endorsed nor dismissed; many committed and creative
minds are presently busily occupied in attempting one
or the other. I seek here only to point out an important
distinction, between those who are motivated by selfinterest and those who are inspired by an interest in
others, that should have been acknowledged in this work
and which is more thoroughly addressed in Francione's
next book, Rain Without Thunder, The Ideology ofthe

Francione's discussion of the concept of "standing,"
which is the doctrinal license by which a person presents
her complaint in court, demonstrates that this has been
the ideal mechanism for keeping human/animal
conflicts out. Just as a chair could not complain about
how its owners treat it, so are claims asserted on behalf
of animals dismissed by courts as absurd. As property,
animal interests are simply beyond the court's reach.
This despite the fact that plenty of others who are unable
to advance complaints on their own behalf, such as
children, the mentally disabled and corporations, do so
all of the time by way of representatives.
As mentioned above, Francione's thorough
examination of anti-cruelty cases in the second part of
the book helps to prove his thesis and verifies that any
inquiry into any type of animal use ends as soon as the
user says that a particular use of an animal is necessary
for her purpose, be it scientific, industrial, recreational
or entertaining. Nobody wants an animal to suffer
unnecessarily, but we refuse to convict those responsible
for mule diving, bear wrestling or bow hunting.
In the third part of the book, the focus is on the use of
animals in experimentation. Has the celebrated American
Animal Welfare Act been a useful tool in the attempt to
get animals out of research? Consider the following:

Animal Rights Movement. 4
In addition to considering whose use of animals does

Neither the nature nor the number of experiments
conducted in the name of science has improved since
Schopenhauer wrolte this passage one hundred and fifty
years ago. 5 Ironically, it is by way of this most heavily
regulated animal use that animals are most horribly made
to suffer. The very title of the federal Animal Welfare Act
is misleading, in that the Act does nothing to serve the
interest of animals. On the contrary, it serves the doubly
harmful purpose of, first, entrenching as acceptable the

When I was studying at Gottingen, Blumenbach
spoke to us very seriously about the horrors
of vivisection and told us what a cruel and
terrible thing it was; wherefore it should be
resorted to only very seldom and for very
important experiments which would bring
immediate benefit. .. Nowadays, on the
contrary, every little medicine-man thinks he
has the right to torment animals in the cruelest
fashion in his torture chamber so as to decide
problems whose answers have for long stood
written in booJlcs into which he is too lazy and
ignorant to stick his nose.

and does not interest the court and the nature of the
analysis which the court will apply upon arrival, there
is another question. Who gets to bring her concern about
animal use to court in the first place? Not just anybody
can complain to ajudge about anything; one must prove
that she is specifically affected by a particular fact
situation to be entitled to the court's attention.

Winter & Spring 1996

75

Between the Species

Review ofFrancione's Animals, Property and the Law

use of animals as tools in experiments without ever
questioning the propriety ofsuch behavior, and, second,
creating a public perception that there are laws in place
to ensure animal interests are being looked after.
Readers of Francione's book might be surprised to
learn that the Act came into being to address the
complaints of people whose pets were being stolen for
use in research. Many years later, a major emphasis in
the Animal Welfare Act and in the equivalent legislation
of other jurisdictions continues to be on the facilities
which supply the animals to be used.
Animals, Property and the Law is at once compelling
and depressing as a result of all of the above and of the
sickening examples of lawful, institutionalized abuse
cited. Despite or because of this, it is a book that ought
to be read by everyone who has ever wondered, Aren't
there laws against that kind of thing? Francione
disabuses the reader of her constructed belief that the
law is making sure that the elephants are not being hurt.
In sum, perhaps the most important statement of the
book is found in the introduction, where Francione
observes that "(o)ur legal system is quite adept at
making it appear as though disenfranchised groups
receive legal protection. By directing our attention to
issues that are often quite tangential, legal discourse
steers clear of the more important fundamental moral
and economic assumptions upon which the legal system
ultimately rests."
Terms such as "due process" and "equality before
the law" are solemnly invoked by judges and lawyers,
but these serve essentially as distractions. With the
discussion framed in normative terms and our minds
focused on the minute particulars of the process, we
are entirely distracted from the very acts which the court
is believed to be scrutinizing. As Chomsky and others
have amply demonstrated, distractions are a powerful
tool of the ruling elite.6 Keeping the minds of the masses
far away from reality protects the behavior by which
the corporate structure derives its profits.
The argument that protection of a particular group
will never exceed that which is needed to most
efficiently exploit its constituents is familiar to anyone
who has ever read Marx. The legal system uses not only
animals; they are just the best example of the
phenomenon, as they are the weakest group and the
only one without any human members as constituents.
Therefore, all argument must be advanced on their behalf.
Most of Francione's analysis could be articulated,
and some of it certainly has been, by opponents of
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sexism and racism and other forms of discrimination.
However, this is a new application of a critique that
has previously been reserved for humans, and to make
it credible, Francione has had to go beyond the level
of discourse at which human rights activists have been
engaged. Unlike other criticisms made by individual
segments of society for their unique benefit, the
principles established in this book are all-encompassing.
The result is a critique which speaks of animals but to
the entire animal kingdom and suggests, without
making the direct argument, that solutions to the
disharmony in North American society are not
effective when fragmented.
Francione's opposition to legal welfarism is not an
attempt to improve animal welfare but to replace the
paradigm by which we understand human/animal
relations in the first place. He invokes rights theory as
a mechanism of ensuring that animals not be treated
merely as means to an end. The notion of "rights" is
clearly enunciated. A right is explained as some value
that requires respect, whether or not exploitation of that
other would be beneficial to someone else. It is a barrier
between the right-holder and everybody else.
Regan's philosophy is invoked. Regan rejects the
welfarist approach (as well as the utilitarian and other
consequentialist approaches more thoroughly described
in the book) and argues that humans and nonhumans
possess equal inherent value precisely because of one
crucial similarity: they are the subject of a life, a life
which is meaningful to the being regardless of that
being's value to everybody else.
This does not mean that humans and animals should
have the same rights or that any rights are more absolute
than others. Regan acknowledges that under his subjectof-a-life regime, conflicts will arise, just as they do
among humans, and have to be resolved. "Rights" simply
means an entitlement to be treated as an end in oneself,
rather than as a means to the end of someone else.
A perfect jurisprudential example cited by
Francione is the nineteenth century case of Dudley &
Stephens, where two sailors stranded at sea with
basically no food or water killed and ate their
companion. Rescued shortly thereafter, the two men
were charged with murder and attempted to raise a
defence of necessity. The court refused to consider the
argument. Humans have the basic rights which cannot
be crossed, no matter what the benefit to others, which
Francione seeks to extend to animals; there are some
interests that are simply not up for grabs.
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emphasis on underlying assumptions, Francione has
focused our attention in the right direction. One cannot
legislate desirable behavior upon a group of people
that has no interest in following nor any idea of why
they are being told to behave inconsistently with their
own beliefs.
The antiquated manner of trying to correct
undesirable behavior by punishment has never been
successful. The exponential growth of the incarcerated
populations of the United States and Canada has not
resulted in a corresponding reduction in the number
of "crimes." Laws aliter only the behavior of society's
most timid, who were probably not causing much
trouble in the fIrst place. They do not stop individuals
or corporations who are wealthy enough to find ways
of exceeding the law's grasp, nor has any murderer
ever hesitated before the kill to consider the possible
legal consequences of the act. The concept of
punishment as a deterrent to murder, be it prison or
capital punishment, has long been recognized as a
disguise for the "eye for an eye" vengefulness endorsed
by the Bible and enthusiastically pursued since that
book's fIrst publication.
Deconstruction of the assumptions on which the
system rests is a process which is not merely legal but
spiritual in nature, and it is not an amendment but an
evolution of ideas which must occur before we see the
end of elephants in circuses. 111is is a lengthy process
which will occur over historical time. A generation
whose most open-minded look to the Celestine
Prophecy for spiritual guidance is still lOo gratefully
manipulated by rhetoric.
One cannot help but realize that the failure on the
part of many advocates to be able to think in tenus of
this kind of historical time contributes to the problem.
Animal advocates are certainly not alone in seeking bandaid solutions; consider food banks and homeless shelters,
foreign aid to "developing" countries, prisons, all of
which are promoted by at least some well meaning
advocates but which, rather than contribute to any long
term solution, entrench and prolong the predicamenl.
Those committed to cbange must be prepared to persevere
with their criticism wilhout seeing results in their lifetime.
Francione seeks to do for animals what Mary
WollslOnecraft didl for women at the end of the
eighteenth century, expose the fallacious assumptions
about them and the arbitrary distinctions which underlie
our daily behavior. With intellectual eloquence, despite
the dry nature of some of the areas he must discuss to

The fIrst read of the book left me slightly disappointed;
convinced that efforts toward change have been
misconceived, and thoroughly sickened by gruesome
examples of lawful animal abuse peppered throughout
the text, I got through the experience convincing myself
that there would be a happy ending, or at least insight
on how to go about achieving one. Upon further thought,
that sophomoric response was replaced by a realization
that Francione had achieved exactly lhe effect he sought;
he persuaded a reader that the present legal system will
not be a tool of animal liberation.
The view that rights theory would be better than the
present state of affairs was also convincing. What is
needed is not an improvement in the condition of
animals used by humans but a willingness to take the
animal's own interest into account when making a
decision that will affect her life. To that extent, rights
theory is instructive. However, before misconceivedly
investing further efforts toward achieving legal status
in the present system, one must consider whether
success in that regard would be much of a coup. There
are problems with this system, with its adversarial nature
and "rights" terminology, some of which have been
identifIed in this book.
Plenty of disenfranchised groups have labored for
and ostensibly achieved the status of right-holder, but
has this liberated them in the true sense? Being told,
for example, that one has rights and having the
resources to assert them are two different things. While
Francione is absolutely right that "rights" is the
language of the existing structure, is the existing
structure the ideal to be pursued?
Other approaches have been suggested by
feminists and Marxists, for example. These are
alluded to by Francione in passing but not explored.
This is unfortunate, as it is not merely a matter of
semantics: rights vs. welfare vs. ethic of caring; the
underlying ideas which inform the terminology are of
prime concern. Despite his essential criticism of
normative assumptions, Francione dismisses the ideas
offered by feminism or Marxism and insists upon
continuing the dialogue in terms of "rights" as "rights
are important normative notions that we use to discuss
the level of both moral and legal protection in
particular circumstances." Other options should not
be so readily ruled oul.
Ullimately, the solution to the problem of human
domination is beyond the scope of the "rights vs.
welfare" debate, or of anyone book. In putting the
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ground related to legislation specific to the Municipality of
Metropolitan Toronto and the authority of its constituent city
councils to enact by-laws regarding various matters.

prove his point, Francione tells us that change is less
frightening than the status quo.
However, just as Wollstonecraft's incisive
commentaries are, two hundred years later, only
beginning to be acknowledged by some and still widely
resisted by others, so too is the kind of change which
Francione seeks to inspire going to occur over historical
time. At this stage of consciousness of the Western
human, with its love of television and marketing and
all things litigious, simple exposure to Francione's ideas
is a happy ending in itself.

2 Washington Stale Bar News, Vol. 49, No. II, November
1995, p.22
3 The right to own property is not enshrined in the
Canadian Constitution as it is in the American, however, it
would be difficult to argue that the Canadian commitment in
this regard is any different.
4 G. Francione, Rain Without Thunder, The Ideology of
the Animal Rights Movement (Temple University Press, 1996)

Notes

5 A. Schopenhauer, Essays and Aphorisms (Penguin
Books, 1970), p. 188

1 First, Ontario's Divisional Court unanimously dismissed
the request that the amended by-law be struck down. However,
the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an appeal on a technical

6 See, for example, N. Chomsky, Necessary Illusions,
Thought Control in Democratic Societies (Anansi Press, 1991)
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